Teorie nezávislosti centrální banky a jejich aplikace

Abstract

The doctoral thesis deals with the issue of central bank independence and its relationship to the budget deficits. The main aim of the thesis is to evaluate impact of central bank independence de jure and de facto to the amount of the budget deficits within the OECD member countries in the period 1990–2011. Within carrying out the main aim the independence de jure and de facto of the OECD member countries is evaluated because in the relevant empirical literature does not provide any index available for all chosen countries in the chosen time period. From the evaluation it is obvious that many countries have increased their independence. That evolution is mainly connected with the entrance of the countries to the EU. The results show that the central bank independence, evaluated by de jure and de facto indexes can influence the budget deficits. Those measures are statistically significant mainly for the OECD countries, subgroup of non-EU member countries and member countries which adopted single currency euro. The only group with insignificant impact of central bank independence is member countries of EU which do not accept the euro as their currency. The direction of influence of de jure indexes is in accordance with assumption positive in all cases; indexes de facto have in accordance with assumption negative influence on the budget deficits.