Reforma mechanismu hlasování v Radě guvernérů Evropské centrální banky

Abstract

An increasing number of eurozone members has evocated a need to reform the voting mechanism in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank and to keep the decision making process about the eurozone monetary policy fast and effective. The objective of this thesis is to analyze the new decision-making mechanism in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, to consider its strengths and weaknesses and to evaluate the perspective of implementation of this system into practice. The first chapter is introduction. The second part briefly explains the development of the Economic and Monetary Union and defines the structure and functioning of the European Central Bank. The third chapter describes the theoretical voting models as well as the existing ones applied in the already existing central banks. The fourth section then presents the proposal of the approved decision-making system which will be used in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. The chapter also focuses on the summarization and evaluation of various particular aspects that speak for or against the implementation of this reform. The fifth, final part, summarizes the findings and seeks to answer the question of the effectiveness of the new voting system in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.